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The Potential for Rural Savings Mobilization: 
Some Evidence from Latin America 
Robert C. Vogel* 
Introduction 
The view is widely held that the primary role of financial 
institutions which serve the rural sector in developing countries 
is to provide abundant credit at subsidized low rates of interest 
in order to promote agricultural output and to redistribute 
income toward the rural poor. However, there is increasing 
evidence that subsidized low interest rates on agricultural 
loans have failed to achieve these two objectives. Because 
credit is fungible, it is difficult and costly, if not impossible, 
to tie subsidized credit to specific agricultural activities. 11 
In addition, recent studies focusing on the recipients of sub-
sidized agricultural credit indicate that the main beneficiaries 
are not the rural poor, as credit is highly concentrated in 
large loans to relatively wealthy farmers.~/ The purpose of 
the present paper is not to pursue ~hese arguments further, but 
rather to examine the issue of the abundance of credit, that 
is, whether some alternative to the current approach might not 
* Professor of Economics, Syracuse University, and Visiting 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University. 
1/ See J.D. Von Pischke and Dale W Adams, "Fungibility and the 
Design and Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Projects," 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 1980. 
See Robert C. Vogel, "The Effect of Subsidized Credit on the 
Distribution of Income in Costa Rica," pape~ presented at the 
Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, Tucson, 
Arizona, April 1977. 
' 
-2-
facilitate a larger volume of credit for the rural sector in 
developing countries and thereby do more to promote agricultural 
output and redistribute income toward the rural poor. 
Because the current approach emphasizes the provision of 
credit to the rural sector at subsidized low rates of interest, 
it must necessarily rely on some external donor or some internal 
source of tax revenues to obtain resources for the subsidy. 
In fact, the failure of industrialized countries to provide 
more subsidized resources, either directly or through interna-
tional lending agencies such as the World Bank or the Inter-
American Development Bank, has been widely deplored in recent 
years. In spite of urging the industrialized countries to do 
more, the governments of most developing countries have them-
selves been unwilling to expand greatly the portion of tax 
revenues going to support subsidized credit for the rural 
sector. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that the 
industrialized countries should be implored to give more, or 
the developing countries to allocate more of their scarce tax 
revenues to subsidizing credit for the rural sector, neither 
of which is likely to happen in any case. Rather, the present 
paper argues that substantial resources exist in the rural 
sectors of most developing countries which are largely unutilized 
and that these resources are unutilized in part because of the 
current approach which emphasizes the continuing dependence of 
the rural financial system on foreign grants or taxation of 
other sectors of the domestic economy. 
' 
' 
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The perceived necessity of relying on foreign grants or do-
mestic taxation comes from the widely-held view that savings 
cannot be mobilized in rural areas of developing countries because 
most of the rural population has no margin for saving over con-
sumption needs. In addition, urban-based financial institutions 
are said to be uninterested in the small sums that might be 
mobilized in rural areas, while rural institutions are thought 
to lack the administrative and technical skills necessary for 
the successful mobilization of savings. Based on the experience 
of credit unions in Peru and Costa Rica, and especially on the 
experience of the Banco Nacional para las Cooperativas of Peru 
(BANCOOP), the present paper argues that these views are not 
correct and that large amounts of voluntary savings can be· 
mobilized in rural areas of developing countries if the proper 
incentives are present.l/ 
The current approach of relying on foreign grants and do-
mestic tax revenues to provide subsidized low interest rate 
credit to the rural sector creates strong incentives against 
mobilizing domestic savings. l:<'inancial institutions are certain 
to prefer obtaining low-cost resources from foreign donors or 
from agencies of their own government to the alternative of 
obtaining resources from domestic savers who must be paid 
ll See Dale W Adams, "Mobilizing Household Savings Through Rural 
Financial Markets," Economic Development and CuTtu·raT Change,, 
April 1978, and F.J.A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit 
Societies in the Third World: A Message," Saving and 
Development, 1977, #4, for additional evidence. 
... 
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interest rates high enough to compensate them for the use of 
these resources. If, in addition, financial institutions are 
required to make loans at subsidized low interest rates to 
support certain agricultural activities, they will be faced 
with two unattractive alternatives: (1) make loans at the 
same low interest rates with resources mobilized from domestic 
savers and thereby incur losses on these loans; or (2) charge 
higher interest rates on loans which are based on higher-cost 
resources and then attempt to explain to the borrowers paying 
the higher rates why they were discriminated against. Given 
such incentives, it is not difficult to understand why financial 
institutions in developing countries have not focused on mobil-
izing domestic . 4/ savings.-
A project sponsored by the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), which was initiated in Peru in 1979, is the basis 
for much of the evidence presented below in support of the 
possibility of successful savings mobilization in rural areas 
of developing countries. This AID project has several segments, 
but here only the aspects relating to savings mobilization will 
be discussed in any detail. The project includes technical 
assistance to help BANCOOP with its savings mobilization efforts 
4/ See Thomas E. Weisskopf, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow 
on Domestic Saving in Underdeveloped Countries," Journal of 
International Economics, February 1972, for traditional argu-
ments and evidence based on 44 developing countries for the 
negative impact of foreign capital on domestic saving. 
' 
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in two target areas in rural Peru and, in addition, technical 
assistance through BANCOOP to help the credit unions in these 
two target areas with their savings mobilization activities. 
Savings mobilization by the credit unions ·will be discussed 
first because in this way the environment in which Bancoop 
initiated its savings mobilization activities can better be 
understood. After the discussion of Bancoop's substantial sue-
cess with savings mobilization in rural Peru, savings mobiliza-
tion by credit unions in Costa Rica will be examined briefly to 
show that the Peruvian experience is not, and need not be, 
unique. 
Peruvian Credit Unions 
After years of strong growth, Peruvian credit unions began 
to experience serious difficulties in the mid-1970s, due largely 
to a dramatic upsurge of inflation and the failure of the credit 
unions to adjust their traditional low interest rate policies 
in the face of this inflation. From the early 1950s through 
1973 the rate of inflation in Peru averaged less than 10 percent 
per year, but accelerated to over 30 percent per year in 1976 
and 1977 and over 50 percent per year in 1978 and 1979. 
Until mid-1976, interest rates were rigidly controlled by the 
Peruvian Central Bank at 5 percent on savings deposits, 7 per-
cent on time deposits, and 12 percent on short-term loans. 
These interest rate ceilings were raised beginning in mid-1976 
(, and significantly in mid-1978. During 1979 and 1980, the ceiling 
rate on savings deposits was 30.5 percent, while time deposits 
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earned up to 35.5 percent on deposits of one year duration. The 
nominal ceiling rate for loana was 32.5 percent during 1979 and 
1980, but effective interest rates could easily be 60 percent 
or higher through the use of commissions, compensating balances 
and other devices. 
When the AID-BANCOOP project was initiated in 1979, none 
of the five major credit unions in the two target areas had 
taken advantage of the opportunity to raise interest rates. 
Rather, these credit unions continued to follow the tradition 
of charging 1 percent per month on loans. With such low inter-
est rates on loans, the credit unions were unable to pay high 
enough interest rates on savings and time deposits to compete 
' with other financial institutions, especially the commercial 
banks, which had quickly taken advantage of the increases in 
interest rate ceilings. Thus, the credit unions were forced 
to rely for their resources almost entirely on the capital con-
tributions of their members, on which dividends are limited to 
6 percent per year by the regulations of the Peruvian Central 
Bank. 
These interest ·rate policies have created serious perverse 
incentives and substantial problems for the credit unions. 
On one hand, members have an incentive to borrow as much as 
possible because interest rates on loans far below the rate of 
inflation mean that borrowers have to pay back in real terms 
much less than the amount borrowed. On the other hand, members 
' have little or no incentive to make time and savings deposits 
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with their credit unions because the purchasing power of these 
deposits is rapidly eroded by inflation when adequate interest 
rates are not paid. Members who make capital contributions to 
their credit unions do so primarily for the purpose of getting 
access to loans, and such loans can be as much as three times 
the amount of a member's capital contribution under the regula-
tions of most Peruvian credit unions. 
The results of these interest rate policies can readily be 
seen in the substantial problems experienced by the five major 
credit unions in the two target areas of the AID-BANCOOP project. 
There have been increasing complaints of severe shortages of 
loanable funds, as the demand for low interest rate loans far 
' exceeds members' capital contributions and meagre time and 
savings deposits. Disgruntled members who are told that their 
approved loans cannot be disbursed because of a lack of funds, 
or that there is no point in even applying for a loan, often 
cease making capital contributions to their credit unions and 
become inactive. For some credit unions the loss of active 
.. 
members has spread to serious repayment problems as members 
see no point in repaying old loans when the prospects of ob-
taining new loans are bleak.2./ In addition, many credit unions 
are experiencing substantial operating deficits as stagnant 
See Robert C. Vogel, "Rural Financial Market Performance: 
Implications of Low Delinquency Rates," American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, forthcoming, for a discussion of the 
importance of good service on new loans in maintaining good 
repayment rates on outstanding loans • 
' 
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interest income fails to keep pace with the operating costs which 
increase with inflation. Even those credit unions which have 
managed to continue to grow in nominaL terms have seen the pur-
chasing power of their capital more than halved since the 
mid-1970s. 
In spite of the important role in the AID-BANCOOP project 
of technical assistance through BANCOOP to help the credit 
unions with savings mobilization, the credit unions in the two 
terget areas have been slow to accept the higher interest rate 
policies which are a prerequisite to successful savings mobili-
zation. As of the end of 1979, only two of the five credit 
unions had raised their interest rates. One of these changed 
its interest rate policies only after it had reached the verge 
of collapse and had received an inordinate proportion of the 
project's technical assistance in the form of detailed analysis 
and persistent explanation of the consequences of its low inter-
est rate policies. The other, however, had quickly raised its 
interest rates to the maximum permitted by the Central Bank's 
regulations and has subsequently nad significant success in 
mobilizing additional time and savings deposits. 
As of mid-1980, two of the other credit unions in the tar-
get areas had also raised their interest rates. One of these 
became convinced of the need to raise interest rates on loans 
in early 1980 because of operating losses, but the need to 
raise interest rates on time and savings deposits sufficiently 
' to compete with other financial institutions in mobilizing 
-. 
• 
.. 
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savings was not recognized. The other credit union raised inter-
est rates to the maximum permitted on time and savings deposits, 
but gave so little publicity to these changes that several em-
ployees of the credit union were unaware of the new interest 
rates. As of mid-1980, one credit union still had made no change 
in its interest rates, although increases have been proposed 
by members of the credit union's board and discussed at the 
annual meeting. Because of the slowness to change interest 
rates, in the case of only one credit union is it possible at 
this point to see significant success with savings mobilization. 
Before proceeding to analyze BANCOOP's success with savings 
mobilization in the same two areas of rural Peru, it is inter-
esting to speculate why the credit unions have been so reluc-
tant to change their interest rate policies.£/ There are at 
least four hypotheses worth noting, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. The first is that credit unions are simply 
confused by the rhetoric of cooperativism, and members genuinely 
believe that raising interest rates on loans would be usurious 
and that problems can best be dealt with by appeals to altruism 
against the economic rationality of individual members. The 
second is that members who are on the boards of directors or 
key policymaking committees have much better access to credit 
union loans than most other members and use the rhetoric of 
~/ See Robert c. Vogel, "Barriers to Financial Reform," Interna-
tional Conference on Rural Finance, Calgary, Canada, August 
1979, for a discussion of the difficulties of implementing 
interest rate reform in a somewhat different context . 
' 
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cooperativism to keep interest rates low on loans for their per-
sonal benefit. The third is that most credit union decision 
makers, including even management itself, have little profes-
sional knowledge of economics or finance and thus view as very 
risky any departure from traditional policies. The fourth is 
that credit unions continually hope for some source of low cost 
resources (if not the capital contributions of their members 
then donations or subsidized credit from some external source) 
through which they can avoid raising interest rates to compete 
for savings. Some evidence for each of these four hypotheses 
can be found in the technical assistance work with the credit 
unions in the two target areas, but perhaps most noticeable 
' was the extreme disappointment of the credit unions on finding 
that the technical assistance with savings mobilization did not 
' 
.. 
include any low cost resources for lending to members. 
BAN COOP 
In spite of its name, BANCOOP is not in fact a bank under 
Peruvian law, but it does carry out most functions of a bank 
such as receiving deposits and making loans. BANCOOP is rather 
a second level cooperative, that is, a cooperative of coopera-
tives with its directors elected by the cooperatives which have 
become members by making capital contributions to BANCOOP. 
Nevertheless, BANCOOP deals not only with its member coopera-
tives, but also with non-member cooperatives, individual members 
of cooperatives, and the general public. BANCOOP was selected 
' 
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by AID to be the primary institution in the project for two main 
reasons: (1) BANCOOP was already following a policy of rela-
tively hi.gh interest rates on loans and deposits within the 
limits of Peruvian regulations, and (2) BANCOOP had been reason-
ably successful as an urban-based operation and was interested 
i.n expanding its operations to serve a rural clientele. 
BANCOOP 'initiated its savings mobilization activities in 
the two target areas of rural Peru during 1979 in the face of 
adverse economic conditions. In addition to the rapid inflation 
mentioned above, the Peruvian economy had shown no real growth 
in several years. Moreover, BANCOOP faced potentially formi-
dable competition from established financial institutions in-
' eluding several commercial banks. Yet, by mid-1980, in the 
' •. 
two target areas BANCOOP had already mobilized in Peruvian soles 
time and savings deposits equal to approximately one million 
U.S. dollars, in contrast to a goal of only $150,000 to be met 
by the end of the project in mid-1981. This success can be 
put more clearly in perspective when it is noted that commercial 
banks and other financial institutions in the two target areas 
have indicated in preliminary figures much lower rates of saving 
mobilization during 1979 and early 1980. Offices of BANCOOP 
outside the two target areas also reported much lower rates of 
savings mobilization through mid-1980. 
The success of BANCOOP in mobilizing savings in the two 
target areas should not obscure the fact that some significant 
problems have been encountered. In the early stages of the 
-12-
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project, BANCOOP officials that thought that it was preferabl~ to con~. 
, -· _:...;_,___....,.,,,_ __ .__ ----~- ~-·-- ·--· 
centrate on mobilizing resources through capital contributions 
of member cooperatives and demand deposits and to de-emphasize 
time and savings deposits because the latter two required ap-
preciable interest payments in contrast to the former two. 
However, the hope of mobilizing low-cost resources through 
capital contributions and demand deposits proved to be illusory. 
As in the case of the credit unions, members made capital con-
tributions in order to request loans, so BANCOOP found that 
capital contributions from member cooperatives increased the 
demand for loans more than they increased the supply of resources 
available for lending. The inflows and outflows of demand de-
' 
posits proved to be quite large relative to balances, so that 
demand deposits have not provided a stable source of funds for 
lending, nor have they been particularly low cost because of 
the clerical expenses involved in maintaining these accounts. 
The subsequent shift toward emphasizing time and savings deposits 
has provided far more resources for lending in the two target 
areas, and the interest and other costs associated with these 
accounts have easily been covered by the interest earned on 
the loans made with these resources. 
Another problem encountered during the first year of the 
project was the much slower rate of savings mobilization in 
one of the two target areas, in spite of the fact that the 
less successful BANCOOP office had opened several months earlier 
' and serves a more heavily populated area. It was found that 
.. 
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' attempts by the member of BANCOOP's board of directors from the 
less successful target area to intervene in the day-to-day oper-
ations of that office had led to a high rate of turnover in 
managers and other key personnel during much of 1979. This, 
' 
in turn, had harmed employee morale and had reduced public con-
fidence in the ability of the BANCOOP office in that target area 
to survive and prosper. However, the durability of the current 
manager of that BANCOOP office has led to improved employee 
morale and depositor confidence, so that the rate of savings 
mobilization during 1980 has been approximately the same in 
the two target areas. A final puzzle worth noting was the 
slowness of BANCOOP to extend the successful savings mobiliza-
tion techniques developed in the two target areas to offices 
in other areas. Perhaps the explanation, as suggested in the 
case of the Peruvian credit unions, is the difficulty of con-
vincing individuals to deviate from traditional approaches when 
they do not have enough professional knowledge to be confident 
in the success of a new approach. In any case, several BANCOOP 
offices along the northern coast of Peru successfully adopted 
new savings mobilization techniques beginning in mid-1980. 
One of the principal reasons for BANCOOP's success in sav-
ings mobilization has been the payment of high rates of interest 
on time and savings deposits, the maximum permitted under Peruvian 
regulations. There are, however, other factors which may be 
equally important. The experience, discussed above, of the 
' BANCOOP office with high turnover of key personnel indicates the 
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importance of depositor confidence and employee morale. Employee 
performance is an important factor in successful savings mobili-
zation which is often overlooked. It is generally recognized 
that good service in the form of convenient location of offices 
and convenient hours of operation is important in attracting 
potential depositors, and in this respect BANCOOP compares quite 
favorably with other financial institutions in the two target 
areas, especially with the commercial banks. However, it is 
seldom recognized that rapid service with a minimum of paper-
work and other formalities is at least as important, and in 
this respect the advantage of BANCOOP over the other financial 
institutions appears to be even greater. A principal reason 
' for good employee performance, which results in good service 
for depositors, is incentives for BANCOOP employees which are 
tied to the amount of time and savings deposits mobilized. 
Otherwise, more clients and more deposits simply mean more work 
for employees. 
' 
Savings mobilization campaigns, which include substantial 
incentives for employee performance, are the other important 
element in BANCOOP's success in mobilizing savings in the two 
target areas and, more recently, along the northern coast of 
Peru. So far during 1980, BANCOOP has run three very effective 
savings campaigns. The first, which actually began in December 
of 1979 and ran through the middle of January, involved free 
instant photographs for those who deposited small amounts, a 
raffle of cameras, and free cameras for those who made large 
' 
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time deposits. The second, which ran from early February until 
April, involved free school supplies for small deposits, a 
raffle of school supplies and bicycles, and free bicycles for 
large time deposits. The third savings mobilization campaign, 
which began in July and ran until September, featured raffles 
of color television sets and other electrical appliances and 
immediate prizes of these same articles for large time deposits. 
This campaign departed from the earlier campaigns in some im-
portant aspects. First, as noted above, it was adopted by 
BANCOOP offices outside the two target areas. Second, the 
emphasis shifted toward time deposits and toward prizes which 
would have major appeal to more affluent and more urban groups 
(, within the target areas. The earlier campaigns not only empha-
sized a mucn larger number of smaller prizes but also emphasized 
' 
•. 
immediate prizes in order to sp1·ead conf ldence in the newly-
opened BANCOOP offices among a potentially large rural clientele.11 
The current phase of the AID-BA!~COOP project involves a 
detailed analysis of BANCOOP's successful savings mobilization 
efforts. In particular, the thousands of savings accounts which 
have been opened at the BANCOOP offices in the two targe~ areas 
are being studied with respect to the characteristics of the 
depositors and the behavior of the accounts over time. A fear 
See Augusto Chanam~, "Pautas a Considerar en la Planificacion 
de una Campana de Promocion," Seminario sobre El Proceso 
Inflacionario y su Incidencia en las Cooperativas de Ahorro 
y Credito, San Jose, Costa Rica, September 1980, for a 
detailed discussion of the BANCOOP savings mobilization 
campaigns. 
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' expressed early in the project was that savings would be deposited 
during campaigns in order to secure prizes and would then be 
quickly withdrawn. This fear has proven unfounded as savings 
accounts opened during camp~igns and those opened at other times 
do not show significantly different behavior, and both groups 
' 
of savings accounts have on the average maintained balances 
over time which tend toward the amount of the initial deposit. 
The main difference between campaign and non-campaign periods 
is that substantially more new accounts are opened during sav-
ings mobilization campaigns. However, the analysis has not 
yet progressed to the point where it is possible to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the recent emphasis on time deposits 
rather than savings accounts, nor has the importance of the 
different elements in each of the campaigns yet been analyzed. 
Interviews are currently being carried out in one of the 
target areas with a random sample of 100 BANCOOP depositors 
and 100 other jndividuals who are not BANCOOP depositors, but 
who are similar to these depositors in other respects. The 
purpose of these interviews is not only to discover what aspects 
of BANCOOP 1 s savings mobilization efforts are most appealing to 
potential depositors, but also to discover what are the prin-
cipal sources of these deposits. Knowing the source of these 
deposits may be useful for BANCOOP's promotional activities, but 
for macroeconomic analysis it is particularly important whether 
they are coming from reduced consumption, reduced holdings of 
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unproductive physical assets, or reduced holdings of other finan-
cial assets. In addition, the relationship between time and 
savings deposits and other BANCOOP services is being studied, 
that is, whether individuals tend to make time and savings de-
posits first and then are drawn to other BANCOOP services, such 
as loans and checking accounts, or vice versa. The daily inflows 
and outflows from BANCOOP's checking and savings accounts are 
also being analyzed in order to make recommendations about the 
appropriate level of reserves for these accounts. 
Before turning to the discussion of savings mobilization 
by credit unions in Costa Rica, it is worthwhile to mention 
briefly the impact of BANCOOP's savings mobilization efforts 
on its financial viability and on its lending behavior. Under 
the impact of inflation BANCOOP had drastically shortened the 
maturity of its loans and consequently had shifted its loan 
portfolio away from cooperatives, both member and non-member, 
and towards individuals. Higher interest rates and the greater 
availability of resources due to successful savings mobilization 
have permitted some lengthening of maturities and some shift 
of the loan portfolio back toward cooperatives. Throughout the 
period there has been no lack of demand for BANCOOP loans, even 
at effective interest rates of more than 60 percent per year, 
and many borrowers have stated that rapid service is more impor-
tant than low interest rates. BANCOOP's financial viability 
,. also appears to have improved during the period of successful 
savings mobilization efforts. Inadequate accounting procedures, 
' 
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especially with respect to delinquent loans, make BANCOOP's stated 
profits somewhat dubious, but in any case both the delinquency 
situation and profits appear to have improved during the past 
year.~/ 
Costa Rican Credit Unions 
A study of savings mobilization by Costa Rican credit unions 
which served as the main background paper for a recent seminar 
in Costa Rica shows that the Peruvian experience with savings 
mobilization is not different from what can be observed in 
other countries of Latin America.21 In late 1978, Costa Rica 
underwent a major financial reform in which many interest rates 
were totally freed from control by the Central Bank while 
others were increased and allowed to float with international 
interest rates. In addition, increasing rates of inflation 
during the past two years have tended to push interest rates 
higher since the beginning of the reform. Many credit unions 
in Costa Rica, as in Peru, have failed to raise interest rates 
and have thus been unable to mobilize additional resources 
through time and savings deposits. These credit unions have 
also experienced a loss of active members and an increase in 
8/ See George Wohanka, "The Impact of Successful Savings Mobili-
zation on BANCOOP's Financial Viability and Lending Behavior," 
paper presented to AID, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 
December 1980. 
See John F. Gadway and Robert C. Vogel, "La Inflacion y la 
Tasa de Interes," Seminario sabre El Proceso Inflacionario y 
su Incidencia en las Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito, 
San Jose, Costa Rica, September 1980. 
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delinquent loans as members discover that these credit unions 
cannot mobilize adequate resources to provide new loans. 
However, in Costa Rica several credit unions have been willing 
to raise interest rates on loans and deposits as high as neces-
sary to compete vigorously with other financial institutions 
including commercial banks. These credit unions have con-
tinued to grow, not just in nominal terms, but in the real 
volume of deposits and loans and in the number of new active 
members. 
In the discussion at the Costa Rican seminar, many credit 
unions lamented the lack of an altruistic cooperative spirit 
among their members, but almost all recognized that individual 
' economic rationality requires realistically high interest rates 
for credit unions to be able to mobilize the resources neces-
sary to provide good service to their members and, hence, to 
survive. There was, just as within BANCOOP in Peru, disagree-
ment as to whether it was better to emphasize savings deposits 
or time deposits in savings mobilization strategies, and the 
preferred strategy often seemed to depend on the characteris-
tics of the members of the particular credit union. The idea 
of savings mobilization campaigns did not meet with universal 
acclaim from Costa Rican credit unions, in part because of 
apparent confusion among the necessity of lecturing members on 
the importance of an altruistic cooperative spirit, improving 
public relations in general, and designing and implementing a 
(, savings campaign with specific objectives. There was also 
' 
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considerable debate about the possibility or desirability of 
careful supervision of the use by members of credit union loans 
as a complement to savings mobilization. 
Conclusion 
It is possible to mobilize substantial amounts of savings 
in the rural areas of developing countries if the proper incen-
tives are present. Proper incentives include not only ade-
quately high interest rates for depositors, but also financial 
institutions in which depositors can have confidence and which 
provide good service for depositors, and this in turn requires 
adequate rewards to promote good performance by the employees 
' of financial institutions. In addition, the success of BANCOOP's 
savings mobilization campaigns indicates that special promo-
tional efforts for savings can also be very effective. 
International lending institutions might consider adjust-
ing their policies and attempting to inject resources into the 
rural financial markets of developing countries in a way that 
encourages proper incentives for savings mobilization. One 
possible approach would be grants or subsidies in the form of 
low interest rate loans to rural financial institutions to 
match in some proportion the savings newly mobilized by these 
institutions. Through the generation of additional savings 
such an approach would make credit more abundant for the ulti-
mate recipients of loans in the target group., This could be 
C far more effective in promoting agricultural output and 
.. 
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' redistributing income toward the rural poor than the traditional 
policies of subsidized low interest rate loans for small farmers 
and other agricultural producers. 
' 
' 
• 
1 
• 
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